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ABSTRACT
In 1982, Alaska’s twelve regional Native corporations finalized and executed a
settlement agreement ending a decade of litigation involving Section 7(i) of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The 121-page Settlement Agreement is
complex and covers a number of issues. The Agreement annually governs the
distribution of tens of millions in revenue shared between the regional
corporations pursuant to Section 7(i). This Article reviews the history of the
Settlement Agreement, with emphasis on the negotiations that led to it, as well
as the legal challenges regarding the Agreement since its execution. This
Article also reviews the Agreement, section-by-section, and provides insight
from court cases, arbitration decisions, and other analysis of sections in the
Agreement. Finally, this Article recommends that the twelve regions consider
amending the Agreement to modernize it and address issues that have arisen
since 1982 that were not anticipated by the drafters of the Agreement. This
Article is a follow-on to ANCSA Section 7(I): $40 Million Per Word and
Counting, which reviewed the history of Section 7(i).
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INTRODUCTION
In 1982, twelve regional corporations, created pursuant to the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act1 (ANCSA or the “Act”), entered into a
settlement agreement that ended a cycle of litigation, which had persisted
for almost a decade over the simple concept contained in Section 7(i) of
the Act.2 Section 7(i), a key component of the Act, requires ANCSA
regional corporations to share 70% of revenue derived from timber or
subsurface resources with the other eleven regional corporations.
Specifically, Section 7(i) provides:
Except as provided by subparagraph (B), 70 percent of all
revenues received by each Regional Corporation from the timber
resources and subsurface estate patented to it pursuant to this
chapter shall be divided annually by the Regional Corporation
among all twelve Regional Corporations organized pursuant to
this section according to the number of Natives enrolled in each
region pursuant to section 1604 of this title. The provisions of
this subsection shall not apply to the thirteenth Regional
Corporation if organized pursuant to subsection (c) hereof.3
The Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”
or the “Agreement”) is an important and complicated document that has
governed the distribution of $2.5 billion in revenue shared since 1982.4 In
Volume 33:2 of Alaska Law Review, tied to the journal’s 2016 symposium

1. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–29 (2012)).
2. See Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (June 1982) [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement] (on file with authors). A current version of the Settlement Agreement
including the two amendments made since 1982 is available at
http://www.lbblawyers.com/ancsa/7i%20Settlement%20
Agreement%20AMENDED.pdf.
3. ANCSA § 7(i).
4. See McDowell Group, Economic Benefits of ANCSA Section 7(i) and 7(j)
Revenue, 1 (Jan. 2017) (“Between FY1982 and FY2015, a cumulative total of $2.5
billion in 7(i) revenue has been received by all ANCs combined.”) (on file with
authors); Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., ASRC Reaches Historic
Milestone in Revenue Sharing (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.asrc.com/Press
Releases/Pages/ASRC-Historic-Revenue-Sharing.aspx (announcing that ASRC
has distributed over one billion dollars to other Alaska Native Corporations
pursuant to Section 7(i) obligations); Red Dog Mine, NANA REG’L CORP., INC.,
http://www.nana.com/regional/resources/red-dog-mine (last visited Sept. 17,
2017) (“NANA has distributed approximately $820 million to other regions and
at-large shareholder[s] via the 7(i) sharing provisions . . . . “); Press Release,
Sealaska Corp., Sealaska Announces December Distribution Totaling $11.7
Million, http://www.sealaska.com/news/item/2013-11-15/sealaska-announces
-december-distribution-totaling-117-million (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (noting
“Sealaska has paid more than $317 million into [the Section 7(i)] pool”).
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reflecting on the forty-five years of ANCSA’s existence, we described the
challenges of Section 7(i) revenue-sharing and how the Settlement
Agreement had resolved contentious litigation among Native
Corporations. This Article provides a more detailed description of the
Settlement Agreement itself by providing a section-by-section analysis of
the Agreement. After describing the Settlement Agreement’s history,5 the
Article then reviews the two amendments to the Settlement Agreement
since 1982. Next, the Article conducts a complete sectional analysis of the
Agreement and reviews several legal challenges made against the
Agreement since its execution. The Article concludes with an analysis of
the possible amendments to the current version of the Settlement
Agreement.

I. HISTORY OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The simplicity of the original language of Section 7(i), and the lack of
implementing regulations, led to a decade of litigation between the
regional corporations.6 Aided by the Special Master appointed by court
order in Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. (Aleut II)7 to assist in
managing the complex, multi-party litigation, the leaders of the ANCSA
regional corporations recognized the futility and extraordinary cost of
constant and ongoing litigation.8 Complications were exacerbated by
5. For a more detailed review of the history of Section 7(i), see Aaron M.
Schutt, ANCSA Section 7(I): $40 Million Per Word and Counting, 33 ALASKA L. REV.
229, 231–37 (2016).
6. See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53 (D.
Alaska 1975) (six decisions from this docket are discussed infra); Doyon, Ltd. v.
NANA Reg’l. Corp. (Doyon v. NANA), No. 1531-74, at 4 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported
mem. op.) (on file with authors) (discussing numerous issues including the
meaning of “all revenues,” the interest charge for late distributions, and the
agreements subject to distribution under Section 7(i)). The Aleut Corp. v. Arctic
Slope Reg’l Corp. case led to five orders issued between 1976 and 1980, several of
which were appealed to the Ninth Circuit: Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp.
(Aleut I), 410 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Alaska 1976); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l
Corp. (Aleut II), 417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom Aleut Corp.
v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut III), 421 F. Supp. 862 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in
part sub nom Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut IV), 424 F. Supp. 397
(D. Alaska 1976), aff’d sub nom Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut V),
484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska 1980); see also Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp.,
569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978); Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723
(9th Cir. 1978). This article will not review the litigation history in detail. For a
more detailed review, see Schutt, supra note 5, at 242–53.
7. 417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom. Aleut III, 421 F.
Supp. 862 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom Aleut IV, 424 F. Supp. 397 (D.
Alaska 1976), aff’d sub nom Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska 1980).
8. The very first court decision on Section 7(i), Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74,
at 8, recognized that the congressional desire to minimize litigation and its costs
“ha[d] not been altogether fulfilled.” See also Memorandum from Elizabeth
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Sealaska Corporation, which was at the time the largest of the 7(i) payor
regional corporations, due to its abundant timber resources, along with
several other regional corporations, failing to distribute “potential § 7(i)
revenues, citing the substantial uncertainties . . . in attempting to account
for such revenues with the small amount of guidance presently
available.”9
Due to these costs and disagreements, by the late 1970s, the regional
corporations began discussing a comprehensive settlement agreement
regarding Section 7(i) obligations. After first meeting in 1977,10 several
regional corporations began “a series of meetings concerning 7(i) . . . to
sit down and hammer out the principles of the 7(i) and to come up with a
document” that the various regions could ratify.11 Several regional
corporations met again in 1979 “to discuss and assess the 7(i) problem and
to study the possibility of an out-of-court settlement of the issues.”12 An
initial sharing agreement, entitled ‘A 7(i) Revenue Sharing Agreement,’
was drafted by Cook Inlet Region, Inc. and circulated among all the other
corporations.13
After years of intermittent meetings, Sealaska Corportation invited
the other regional corporations to meet in Warm Springs, Oregon in
1981.14 Sealaska observed that “[t]he stakes are very high,” but “the
litigation ought to be resolved by the affected corporations rather than by
the court, if at all possible.”15 All twelve regions participated and sent
their presidents and attorney representatives.16

Ingraham, Legal Counsel, Doyon, Ltd., to Tim Wallis, President, Doyon, Ltd. 1
(June 8, 1981) (on file with authors) (“[T]o continue the litigation on deductions as
well as other regions’ revenues would require a minimum of two years, at an
average expenditure of $300,000 per year for outside attorneys’ fees and costs.”).
9. Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., ANCSA 7(i) Historical Synopsis 6 (Aug.
20, 1981) (on file with authors).
10. In 1977, several regional corporations began a series of meetings to
develop an agremeent that the various regions could ratify. Minutes of Board
Meeting of February 14, Koniag, Inc. 15 (1978) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen papers,
Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Library, Univ. of Alaska Anchorage)
(on file with authors).
11. Minutes of Koniag, Inc. Bd. of Dirs. 15 (Feb. 14, 1978) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen
papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Libr., Univ. of Alaska
Anchorage) (on file with authors).
12. Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., supra note 9, at 5.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id.
16. See Interview with Margaret Brown, President and Chief Executive
Officer (Retired), Cook Inlet Region, Inc., in Anchorage, Alaska (Apr. 26, 2016) (on
file with authors).

34.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

11/26/2017 6:21 PM

SECTION 7(I) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

205

In reviewing “the first ‘composite draft’ Section 7(i) settlement
agreement” circulated in June 1981, Doyon’s legal counsel noted “three
essential requirements to a satisfactory settlement.”17 First, the regional
corporations were in agreement that the definitions of “revenues” should
track, as closely as possible, court decisions that had construed the word
to maximize sharing of resource revenues.18 Second, the regional
corporations concurred that any agreed-upon deductions should be
reasonable, and that the reporting requirements should be clear and
further the aim of transparency in revenue sharing and costs.19 Third, the
parties agreed that binding arbitration ought to be the exclusive means
for Section 7(i) dispute resolution.20
Following the Warm Springs meeting, the corporations held regular
settlement conferences and drafting meetings.21 The Special Master later
reported that “the many dozens of Corporation executives, attorneys,
financial advisors and other experts attending each meeting openly
debated each and every issue connected with 7(i).”22 The result was a draft
settlement agreement that, in the Special Master’s words, was “something
of a chimera: at several critical points it contained alternative approaches
which affected the construction of the balance of the proposed
agreement.”23
Section 7(i)’s simple drafting as to revenues leaves many possible
approaches to what types of costs a regional corporation might fairly
incur and should be counted against revenues and recovered by that
corporation because such a cost supports and advances the generation of
revenue that is required to be shared under Section 7(i). For example, with
regard to the deductions side of the equation, Doyon’s team noted that
“[s]ince there [were] no rules to date on deductions, the whole deductions
area [was] very cloudy.”24 The difference between the various regions’
approaches to these questions was dramatic.25 The Special Master and the

17. Memorandum from Elizabeth Ingraham, Legal Counsel, Doyon, Ltd. to
Sam Kito, Dir., Doyon, Ltd. 1 (June 5, 1981) (on file with authors).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Report of the Special Master Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53, at 19 (Mar.
28, 1983) [hereinafter Special Master Report] (on file with authors) (“The
Agreement’s provisions for revenue accounting follow the expansive definition of
§ 7(i) Revenue previously expressed by the Court.”).
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id. at 11.
24. Memorandum from Elizabeth Ingraham, supra note 8.
25. See id. at 1–2 (discussing how “regions might well be allowed virtually
all—or virtually none—of their claimed deductions,” depending on which
categories are disallowed).
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team from the twelve regions had the task of reconciling these differing
viewpoints from the summer of 1981 until the summer of 1982.
On June 29, 1982, the twelve regions reached a final settlement
agreement, subject to the ratification by at least ten of the twelve
corporations’ respective boards of directors.26 The document was 121
pages long including two appendices. The Settlement Agreement:
Represent[ed] an effort by the twelve Regional Corporations to
resolve the cycle of litigation and to bring certainty to the
application of § 7(i). In essence, the “Section 7(i) Settlement
Agreement” represent[ed] an effort by the Regional
Corporations to correct the deficiencies of ANCSA by a detailed
agreement in order to render possible commercially viable
resource development without litigation; it exhaustively defined
terms and concepts, established detailed accounting procedures,
and established a consensus among the Regions on policies for
development of resources.27
All twelve
Agreement.28
A.

regional

corporations

ratified

the

Settlement

Amendments to the Agreement

The regional corporation parties to the Settlement Agreement have
amended the Agreement twice since 1982. In 1990, following several years
of arbitration about the active harvest of Sealaska timber resources,29 the
regions unanimously agreed to amend the Agreement. The amendment
deleted Article II, section 9—a provision addressing the harvest of timber
26. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 103 (showing the ten signatures
of regional corporations on the Settlement Agreement); Memorandum from Jim
Mery, Senior Counsel, Doyon, Ltd., to Doyon Bd. of Dirs. (Sept. 2, 1982) (on file
with authors) (discussing how the agreement would be null and void without at
least ten signatures).
27. James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First
Twenty Years, 38 ANNUAL ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 28 (1992); see also Special Master
Report, supra note 21, at 1 (“[T]he Agreement substitutes a Uniform System of
Accounting and Reporting for the present chaos of twelve Regional Corporations
applying disparate, though equally defensible, accounting methods for
determining net revenues available for distribution.”).
28. See Doyon Bd. Resolution No. 82-53 (Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with authors);
see also Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 5 (D. Alaska
June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with authors).
29. See Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp., AAA No. 75199002386 (Prelim. Op. of
Arbitrators) (Aug. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Sealaska Arbitration Decision]
(McGough, Arb.) (on file with authors); see also Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp.,
AAA No. 75199002386 (Decision and Award of Arbitrators) (Nov. 23, 1988)
(McGough, Arb.) (on file with authors) (regarding the distribution and interest
associated with timber resources under Section 7(i)).
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for a corporation’s own account—from the original Agreement and
added a dozen new pages.30 This amendment, incorporated into Article
III, section 3 of the Agreement, mostly defined allowable active 7(i) costs
for timber.31
The negotiations that led to this amendment began after the Sealaska
Board of Directors, in 1989, “directed that Sealaska cease the active
harvest of ANCSA timber until and unless an agreement can be reached
among the Regional Corporations that allows a rational and prudent
approach to timber valuation.”32
By late March 1989, Sealaska and the eleven other regions entered a
Memorandum of Understanding outlining a term sheet that would later
form the basis of the 1990 amendments.33 At about the same time, the
regions were considering another set of amendments to deal with the net
operating loss (NOL) issues and the interactions with Section 7(i) then
being debated between the regions and village corporations.34 Concurrent
with the general NOL matter were related issues raised by the Mutual
Assistance Agreement (MAA) among a majority of the regional
corporations.35 The MAA helped Calista Corporation avoid a likely
bankruptcy by backstopping a commercial loan with future Section 7(i)
receipts and sales of Calista’s own NOL transactions, which gave Calista
the financial flexibility to restructure its various business interests.36
Despite these issues, the regional corporations did not adopt the proposed
NOL amendments to the Agreement, in part because Congress amended
Section 7(i) to explicitly exclude tax benefits from the definition of
revenue, including revenue from NOL transactions.37

30. See First Amendment to the 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 22, 1990)
(amending Article III, § 3) (on file with authors).
31. Id.
32. Press Release, Sealaska Corp., Sealaska Corporation Will Not Appeal 7(i)
Arbitration Ruling, at 2 (Feb. 9, 1989) (on file with authors).
33. Letter from Byron Mallott, Chief Exec. Officer, Sealaska Corp., to Morris
Thompson, President, Doyon, Ltd. (Mar. 30, 1989) (on file with authors).
34. See Memorandum from Nathan Bergerbest, Gen. Counsel, Doyon, Ltd.,
William Timme, Middleton, Timme & McKay, Chris McNeil, Jr. Gen. Counsel,
Sealaska Corp., and Mark Kroloff, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, CIRI, on
Regional Corp. CEOs and Gen. Counsel (Dec. 11, 1990) (on file with authors).
35. See Mutual Assistance Agreement between Ahtna, Inc., Arctic Slope Reg’l
Corp., Bering Straits Native Corp., Chugach Alaska Corp., Cook Inlet Region, Inc.,
Doyon, Ltd., Koniag, Inc., Sealaska Corp. and Calista Corp., at 3 (Feb. 13, 1991)
[hereinafter Mutual Assistance Agreement] (on file with authors) (agreeing to
“assist Calista in obtaining financing from the Bank”).
36. See id. at 3 (agreeing to “assist Calista in obtaining financing from the
Bank”).
37. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-42, 109 Stat. 353,
357 (1995) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ does not include
any benefit received or realized for the uses of losses incurred or credits earned
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In 2001, the regions, for the second time, unanimously agreed to
amend Article II.38 This time, the regions rewrote section 2(b) of the
Settlement Agreement, regarding resource contract scholarships for
shareholders or members of their families.39 The amendment allowed
regional corporations to exclude from their Gross Section 7(i) Revenue
calculations up to $250,000 per year in scholarships paid directly by a
third party as part of a contract or lease related to Section 7(i) Resources.40
Alternatively, the amendment allowed the regional corporation to
provide $250,000 in scholarships directly from revenue it received from a
third party related to Section 7(i) Resources.41
B.

Sectional Analysis of the Settlement Agreement
Article I – Parties and Definitions

Article I details the parties to the Settlement Agreement and defines
a long set of terms. The parties were explicitly limited to ANCSA regional
corporations, which own the valuable natural resources and are required
to share revenues from those natural resources under Section 7(i), but are
then obligated to share half of 7(i) payments received from other regional
corporations to their respective at-large shareholders and village
corporations under Section 7(j).42 Doyon’s counsel, Arthur Lazarus,
recognized that the exclusion of village corporations as parties to the
Settlement Agreement posed a risk because of the adversity of interests
between the two groups. Lazarus wrote that “[s]ome features of the
proposed Agreement will tend to reduce the size of the 70% resource
revenue pool. . . . Obviously, these provisions may stimulate legal
challenges to the Agreement.”43 Lazarus’s observation proved prescient,

by a Regional Corporation.”).
38. See Amendment No. 99-1 to Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 27,
2001) (amending Article II, § 2) (on file with authors).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id.
42. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 1. The fact that village
corporations were not included as parties was likely due to the combination of the
adversity of interests on some important points and the impracticality of
negotiating with roughly two hundred entities. But the lack of inclusion resulted
in several disputes with village corporations post-Settlement Agreement. See infra
notes 192–98 and accompanying text.
43. Memorandum from Arthur Lazarus, Jr., P.C., to Doyon Bd. of Dirs. 8–9
(July 9, 1982) [hereinafter Lazarus Memo] (on file with authors) (discussing
proposed settlement of Section 7(i) litigation).
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as several village corporations and at-large shareholders sued regional
corporations in the 1990s, challenging several aspects of Section 7(i) and
the Settlement Agreement.44
The long list of defined terms includes the concepts of passive and
active development of ANCSA Section 7(i) Resources, which were first
articulated in the Doyon v. NANA decision in 1976.45 Passive development
is essentially the approach of leasing resource-prospective lands to a third
party company that explores, develops, and produces that resource and
then pays lease rentals, royalties, or some other form of compensation to
the regional corporation as compensation for the resource. By contrast,
active development is the process where the regional corporation directly
participates in those exploration, development, and production activities
on its own or through some form of a joint venture. For the purposes of
the Settlement Agreement, the difference between the two is when a
resource-owning corporation “has made a Substantial Investment of Risk
Capital,” which is defined as an investment greater than 10% of the fair
market value of the investment into exploration or development of the
ANCSA resource and at least $500,000.46 In Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp.47
(the “Sealaska arbitration”), arbitrators described passive revenues as
“generally those revenues derived from a contract to sell to a third party
the right to develop, produce and sell resources which are in their natural
state.”48
The parties defined Section 7(i) Resources as follows: “The timber
resources (other than timber acquired by merger with a Village
Corporation) and resources from the subsurface estate in ANCSA Lands.
Timber resources include both standing timber and future growth.”49
Gross Section 7(i) resources are defined as: “all revenues (including
44. See infra notes 199–212 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Oliver v. Sealaska
Corp., 192 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the revenue sharing claims
of ANCSA); Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105
F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving litigation over the revenue from net
operating losses).
45. See Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, at 9 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported mem. op.)
(on file with authors) (“A Regional Corporation can . . . take the role of an ‘active’
landowner and itself explore for, develop and produce the resource. . . .
Alternatively, it may act as a ‘passive’ landowner and contract with another party
which undertakes at its own expense all the necessary exploration, development
and production of the resources.”).
46. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 3–5 (defining Gross Passive Section
7(i) Revenues, Gross Active Section 7(i) Revenues, and Substantial Investment of
Risk Capital).
47. AAA No. 75199002386 (Prelim. Op. of Arbitrators) (Aug. 11, 1988)
[hereinafter Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op.] (McGough, Arb.) (on file with
authors).
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 2.

34.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE)

210

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

11/26/2017 6:21 PM

Vol 34:2

money, benefits and any other thing of value) received by a Corporation
that are attributable to, directly related to, or generated from the
exploration, development, production, lease, sale or other exploitation of,
or the disposition of any interest in, the Corporation’s Section 7(i)
Resources.”50 This definition is remarkably similar to, albeit slightly
expanded, the Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.51 (Aleut V) court’s
definition: “[R]evenues received by a regional corporation that are
attributable to, directly related to, or generated by the acquisition of an
interest in the corporation’s subsurface estate are revenues subject to the
sharing provisions of section 7(i).”52
Furthermore, the Agreement defines fair market value as “[t]he
amount of money which an informed purchaser, willing but not obliged
to buy, would pay an informed seller, willing but not obliged to sell, for
particular property, goods or services. In determining the Fair Market
Value of land, consideration shall be given to all uses to which the land is
suited and might in reason be applied.”53 The concept of fair market value
was a major issue in the Sealaska arbitration in the late 1980s.54
Additionally, the Agreement defines a Section 7(i) Resource Contract
as:
Any contract or group of contracts for the exploration,
development, production, lease, sale or other exploitation of, or
the disposition of any interest in, a Corporation’s Section 7(i)
Resources, including contracts permitting one or more of such
activities, and also including contracts relating to Section 7(i)
Resources to which a Corporation has succeeded pursuant to
Section 14(g) of ANCSA.55
This language closely tracks the early cases. In Aleut II, the court held
that revenue received from contracts for exploration for subsurface
resources were shareable.56 In Aleut V, the court held that there is a
rebuttable presumption that revenues are shareable when “received

50. Id. at 3.
51. 484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska 1980).
52. Id. at 485.
53. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 7.
54. See Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 47, at 24–34; Schutt, supra
note 5, at 261–62 (discussing the Sealaska timber arbitration).
55. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 9; see also ANCSA § 14(g), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1613(g) (providing that “[a]ll conveyances made [pursuant to ANCSA] . . . shall
be subject to valid existing rights,” including prior federal leases, contracts,
permits, rights-of-way and easements).
56. Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. 900, 902–03 (D. Alaska 1976).
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under an agreement, or a group of agreements that are regarded as one
transaction, which has as its ultimate object the acquisition of an interest
in the subsurface estate . . . .”57
Article II – Revenues
Article II of the Settlement Agreement addresses revenues. Overall,
the Agreement attempts to broadly construe revenues and subject as
much as possible to Section 7(i).58 In addition, Article II addresses and
incorporates many of the holdings of the early court decisions into its
framework for Section 7(i) Revenues.
For example, section 1(b) provides that “if Section 7(i) Revenues are
received in a form other than cash or cash equivalents, the Fair Market
Value at the time of receipt shall be included in Gross Section 7(i)
Revenues.”59 This closely matches the holding in Aleut II, which measured
non-cash receipts as the greater of:
(a) the fair market value of the non-monetary benefit received;
(b) the cost or detriment to the entity furnishing the nonmonetary benefit; or
(c) the difference between the royalty or other cash
consideration actually received and that which would have
been received but for the furnishing of the non-monetary
benefit.60
The Aleut II court further stated that “non-monetary and indirect
benefits should be discouraged in the context of section 7(i) because of the
problems that they invite.”61
The Agreement also makes clear that revenues received prior to
patent or interim conveyance are revenues subject to distribution.62 This
tracks the holding in the Aleut I decision.63
Subsection 1(d) addresses borrowing. It provides that loans secured
by Section 7(i) Resources, or their proceeds, are not Section 7(i) Revenues
“to the extent that the proceeds of such borrowing or sale are used . . . to
finance or refinance Development, Production or Post-Production Costs

57. Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Alaska 1980).
58. See Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 19 (“The Agreement’s
provisions for revenue accounting follow the expansive definition of § 7(i)
Revenue previously expressed by the Court.”).
59. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 15.
60. Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. at 904.
61. Id.
62. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 15.
63. Aleut I, 410 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D. Alaska 1976).
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in connection with the exploitation of Section 7(i) Resources . . . .”64
However, to the extent that a corporation secures borrowing with Section
7(i) Resources that are “greater than the Corporation’s Distributable Share
of Net Section 7(i) Revenues,” then there is a “recognition of Gross Section
7(i) Revenues.”65 This was not a popular provision among the regional
corporations, who recognized that treating borrowing this way would
hinder their ability to raise capital for projects unrelated to Section 7(i)
Resource development.66 Nevertheless, the Special Master insisted upon
its inclusion.67
In 1988, Chugach Alaska Corporation secured $13 million of debt to
The Travelers Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity
Company with “all of the standing and downed timber located on certain
land conveyed to [Chugach]” and rights necessary to harvest the timber
including rock, sand, and gravel.68 Chugach did not disclose the loans or
security interests in its annual Section 7(i) reports to the other regional
corporations for 1988, 1989, or 1990.69 When Chugach filed for bankruptcy
in 1991,70 each of the other regional corporations became creditors in part
because of Article II, section 1(d).71 Chugach and the eleven other regional
corporations entered a settlement agreement in June 1992 to resolve these
issues.72 This episode with Chugach demonstrates the value to the other
regional corporations of assuring that borrowings against Section 7(i)
Resources can serve as a mechanism that is economically equivalent to
revenue and should therefore be shared at the time of the loan.
Section 3 addresses the allocation of revenue between the surface
and subsurface estates—the same issue addressed in Aleut V. It excludes
from Gross Section 7(i) Revenues any compensation received by a
regional corporation for surface rights only to the extent permitted by the
Settlement Agreement.73 There is an inherent tension in allocating

64. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 15.
65. Id. at 18–19.
66. Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Chugach Settlement Agreement between Chugach Alaska Corp. and
Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Ahtna, Inc., The Aleut Corp., Bering Straits Native Corp.,
Bristol Bay Native Corp., Calista Corp., Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Doyon, Ltd.,
Koniag, Inc., NANA Reg’l Corp., and Sealaska Corp., at 1–2 (June 17, 1992)
[hereinafter Chugach Settlement Agreement] (on file with authors).
69. Id. at 3.
70. See In re Chugach Alaska Corp., 147 B.R. 214, No. A91-00207-3-DMD, at 214
(AK LBR 1991) (discussing Chugach Alaska Corporation’s objection to IRS
claims).
71. Chugach Settlement Agreement, supra note 68, at 1.
72. Id.
73. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 27; see also Aleut V, 484 F. Supp.
482, 485 (D. Alaska 1980).
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revenues as between the surface and subsurface when a regional
corporation owns both because revenues attributable to the surface are
not shareable. But on the other hand, accessing the subsurface to develop
and produce valuable resources often requires the construction of
facilities at the surface that burden the surface estate and should therefore
be a compensable event. These tensions therefore require a balance of
these competing realities. Section 3 attempts this balance by capping the
allocation to surface estate at the lesser of fair market value for the surface
rights or the valuation provided in the agreements at issue.74 In both the
Agreement and the Aleut V decision, the burden of proof regarding the
valuation is upon the land-owning regional corporation.75
Section 6 addresses land exchanges. The regional corporations knew
that land exchanges involving ANCSA lands were possible, if not
inevitable, as the land ownership patterns among the three main
landowners in Alaska—the federal government, the state government,
and the ANCSA regional corporations—were implemented at the
detailed, local level from the broad legislative framework of ANCSA.
ANCSA’s land selection pattern combined with existing and desired
federal conservation units, in particular, made for certain awkward land
ownership. An example was the Cook Inlet Land Exchange, which
Congress authorized in 1976.76 The Agreement’s structure tracks the logic
of revenue derived from ANCSA interests: where a corporation
exchanges subsurface interest, alone or in combination with any other
interest, for some other interest, revenue derived from the new interest is
shareable up to the fair market value of the subsurface interest.77 In
contrast, trading a surface estate interest for another interest does not
create a sharing obligation under the Agreement from the new interest
because revenue derived from the surface interest, excepting timber,
would not have been shareable.78
74. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 27.
75. Id.; Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. at 485. In Aleut V, the court’s language
establishing the rebuttable presumption is limited to the subsurface estate, but the
Special Master Report two years later expanded this concept to timber resources
as well. See id. at 485–87; Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 20 (“[T]he
Agreement adopts a rebuttable presumption that any revenues connected with
any disposition of subsurface or timber resources are shareable.”).
76. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1145 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.);
Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-456, 90 Stat. 1934 (identifying Terms and
Conditions for Land Consolidation and Management in the Cook Inlet Area). See
generally Cook Inlet Land Exchange, 30-YEAR ANNIVERSARY NEWSLETTER (Oct. 2006)
(on file with authors).
77. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 25–27.
78. See id. at 32; Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., Civ. No. A96-0343, at 8 (D. Alaska
Sept. 24, 1997) (unreported order on motion to dismiss) (“Article II, subsection
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Section 6 was tested just a year after the Settlement Agreement
became effective. “[Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC)] openly
and candidly admitted that they structured the trade for the Kaktovik
subsurface so as to qualify that trade under section 6(g). ASRC was not
deceitful, was not acting in bad faith, and was not unfair in structuring a
trade that was specifically invited by language” in the Settlement
Agreement.79 But other regional corporations were concerned that the
exchange of certain ASRC surface lands within a federal conservation unit
for potentially extremely valuable subsurface estate should have made
the received subsurface land subject to 7(i) sharing like other ANCSA
subsurface lands.
Section 7 addresses sand and gravel resources. The regional
corporations had litigated the topic of sand and gravel from the time of
ANCSA’s passage in 1971 until the Settlement Agreement in 1982.80 This
was one area where the regional corporations limited the impact of prior
court rulings. In the original Agreement, the regional corporations
recognized that Ninth Circuit decisions ruling that sand and gravel were
Section 7(i) Resources had imposed tremendous difficulty in bookkeeping
for the many small transactions involving sand and gravel.81 The
Settlement Agreement therefore excluded from Gross Section 7(i)
Revenues the first $100,000 of gross revenues derived from sales of “sand,
stone, gravel, pumicite or cinder resources” each fiscal year.82 The section
also provides that if Congress amended ANCSA to exclude sand and

6(g) of the Settlement Agreement is the converse of ANCSA subsection 7(i) in that
it is designed to provide that revenues received from the disposition of surface
estate (other than timber) are not subject to sharing.”) (on file with authors).
79. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., AAA No. 75113030986, at 18 (Mar.
28, 1989) [hereinafter ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op.] (Morris, Arb.) (on file with
authors).
80. See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek Native Corp., 725 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir.
1984); Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 725–26 (9th Cir. 1978),
rev’g Aleut III, 421 F. Supp. 862, 864 (D. Alaska 1976); see also Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor
Forest Res., 39 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing rock resources rather than sand
or gravel).
81. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 35 (referring to Chugach Natives,
Inc., 588 F.2d at 732).
82. Id. At least one village corporation opposed this provision because “the
villages are giving up their right to a portion of the § 7(i) sharing revenues, but do
not gain any guarantee of sand and gravel ownership in return.” Ukpeagvik
Inupiat Corp., Position Paper (Mar. 9, 1983) (on file with Arnold “Ole” Olsen
papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Library, Univ. of Alaska
Anchorage).
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gravel from the requirements of Section 7(i), they would no longer be
considered Section 7(i) Resources under the Settlement Agreement.83 The
1998 amendments to ANCSA did in fact exclude such resources.84
Section 8 addresses mergers of a regional corporation and any other
corporation.85 The section makes clear that following such a merger,
Section 7(i) Resources and Revenues remain subject to sharing under the
Agreement.86 The section also states that the merger or consolidation
transaction itself does not trigger a Section 7(i) Revenue recognition
event.87 This was an important consideration given that NANA and
Ahtna had merged with the majority of the village corporations in each
of their respective regions.88 As such, the question of the impact of Section
7(i) with regard to the then recently completed mergers was a non-issue.
Article III – Deductions
Article III addresses deductions. Unlike revenues, deductions
received almost no attention in the litigation during the 1970s.
Nevertheless, the issue was squarely on the minds of Settlement
Agreement negotiators. In a memorandum summarizing the draft
Settlement Agreement, Doyon’s attorney noted: “[B]y the end of 1980, the
litigation promised to become even more burdensome as the focus of the
court proceedings moved from gross revenues to the complex and
extremely difficult question of allowable deductions.”89
The Special Master’s report made several important observations
regarding the Settlement Agreement’s allowance for deductions. First, it
noted that the “deduction rules operate in three dimensions: what
categories of costs may be deducted; when costs should be recognized;
and what constitute allowable costs within the categories.”90 The Special

83. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 35.
84. See ANCSA Land Bank Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-333, § 8,
112 Stat. 3129, 3134 (codified as 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)).
85. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 36.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Ownership
of
Lands,
NANA
REG’L
CORP,
INC.,
http://www.nana.com/regional/ lands/subsistence/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2017)
(“In 1976, a merger of the area’s regional corporation and ten of the eleven village
corporations resulted in NANA’s ownership of both the surface and subsurface
acreage, with the exception of the surface acreage Kikiktagruk Iñupiat
Corporation (KIC) retained.”); LYDIA L. HAYS, ALASKA NATIVE TRIBES, ANCSA
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, Appendix C (2015) (listing the Ahtna,
Inc. merger with eight of its nine village corporations in 1980 and the NANA
merger in 1976).
89. Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 2.
90. Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 25.
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Master’s report added that the “Agreement introduces three principal
standards for determining the deductibility of an item of cost:
reasonableness, allocability and substantiation.”91
The allowance for deductions became a controversial issue among
the regional corporations. Doyon’s outside counsel noted, “[a]mong the
most controversial issues in the litigation thus was whether general and
administrative costs (G&A) were allowable deductions and, if so, to what
extent. Indeed, Doyon’s own position on this question changed twice.”92
The courts also struggled with this topic, in part because Congress
provided no guidance in the language or legislative history of ANCSA.93
In the first court case between regional corporations regarding Section
7(i), the court proposed “a strictly limited net concept allowing only
deductions which are directly related to the production of [Section 7(i)]
revenues” and expressly disallowed “land selection expenses, salaries of
regular corporate employees, or overhead or administrative expenses.”94
The Settlement Agreement again broke from court precedent and
charted a different path on G&A costs that relies on a formula rather than
an allocation of actual overhead. The Agreement set a standard
deduction, “not subject to audit or change,” at $300,000 per fiscal year.95
In addition, in a single fiscal year, a corporation is permitted to deduct a
percentage of its adjusted Gross Section 7(i) Revenues based on a sliding
scale: 20% on up to $3 million, 6% on up to $100 million, and 4% on
amounts greater than $100 million.96
The Settlement Agreement also specifies costs that could be included
as itemized deductions. The Agreement categorizes a number of costs as
allowable: “Passive Section 7(i) Costs,” including land selection costs
regional corporations incurred in selecting ANCSA lands for resource
potential; pre-conveyance geological and geophysical costs; costs
incurred in negotiating contracts related to Section 7(i) Resources;
contract administration costs; litigation costs related to Section 7(i)
Resources; resource management costs; Section 7(i) Resource taxes; and
costs of acquiring an interest in ANCSA lands, and borrowing costs.97
91. Id. at 29.
92. Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 4.
93. See Aleut III, 421 F. Supp. 862, 868 (D. Alaska 1976) (noting that while
House bill “spoke only in terms of ‘revenues’,” the Senate bill also referred to “net
revenues.”).
94. Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, at 11 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported mem. op.)
(on file with authors).
95. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 38.
96. See id. at 60–61. Unlike tax brackets for federal income taxes, the scale is
not progressive, but brackets the floor and ceiling based on the fiscal year revenue
for each category. See id.
97. See id. at 39–42.
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Additionally, section 5 of Article III requires the corporations to keep
detailed records of allowable Section 7(i) costs.98 For example, in the
ASRC arbitration, the panel rejected ASRC’s cost allocations because
“ASRC made no attempt to keep . . . [t]he requisite contemporaneous
records and detail so as to be able to allocate in accordance with Article
III, Section 5 . . . .”99 Section 5 details the types of allowable costs per
category and the methods of recordkeeping for labor, in-house costs like
travel, outside vendor costs, and dedicated facilities and equipment.100
Subsection (b) provides an allocation methodology for labor and
equipment used for Section 7(i) activities and non-Section 7(i) activities.101
Article IV – Calculation of Distributable Revenues
Article IV is a short but complicated article addressing the
“calculation of distributable revenues.”102 This distributable revenues
concept addresses situations where a regional corporation has both active
and passive 7(i) activities and revenues by allowing a balance of
recovering certain active development costs by off-setting them against
passive revenues within the same period. But it caps that active-topassive transition such that the regional corporation cannot eliminate
sharing of its passive revenues alogether. Section 1 begins by requiring
each regional corporation, for each fiscal year, to first calculate its
Adjusted Gross Passive Section 7(i) Revenues.103 Then,
[i]f that calculation yields a positive number, sixty percent (60%)
of the Corporation’s Adjusted Gross Passive Section 7(i)
revenues shall be segregated and shall be added to the
Corporation’s Adjusted Gross Active Section 7(i) Revenues, if
any, in computing the Corporation’s Adjusted Gross Section 7(i)
Revenues for the year; the other forty percent (40%) shall be
added to the Corporation’s Gross Active Section 7(i) Revenues
for that year.104
The Special Master’s Report to the Aleut court recites the history of
the sixty-forty split. The split was a solution to the debate among the
regional corporations over whether Section 7(i) “established a collective
70% interest in the revenues from individual transactions or parcels of
property” or “realized net revenues, if any, from [a regional
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 55.
ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 79, at 18–19.
See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 56–57.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 62–64.
Id. at 62.
Id.
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corporation’s] timber and subsurface estate taken as a whole.”105 The
Special Master noted that the sixty-forty split “allow[ed] developer
Regional Corporations the opportunity to recover its reasonable costs
from its other [Section 7(i)] Revenues and thus spend with some
confidence the capital needed to earn revenues, while to some extent
protecting other Regional Corporations from the undue diversion of
annual distributions.”106
Article V – Compliance Mechanism
Section 1 requires each regional corporation to distribute to the other
eleven corporations “their Distributive shares of the Corporation’s Net
Section 7(i) Revenues” for the prior fiscal year within ninety days of the
close of the fiscal year.107 This was an important inclusion in the
Settlement Agreement as Section 7(i) itself is silent as to the timeframe for
required sharing of Section 7(i) revenues.108 This is another example of the
Settlement Agreement negotiators deciding to make explicit prior court
holdings, particularly the ninety-day timeframe established by the
earliest court decision on Section 7(i) in Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA Regional
Corp.109
If a corporation fails to make appropriate and timely distribution of
the required sums, the Agreement provides for the payment of interest
“at the Prime Rate plus five percent (5%) per year on all amounts not
distributed or escrowed.”110 In 2002, Sealaska exercised this provision
when it “deferred the Company’s own fiscal year 2001 Section 7(i) and 7(j)
distributions, due March 30, 2002, until the summer of 2002.”111
Additionally, section 3 sets out the reporting requirements. It
requires that the corporation issue a Section 7(i) annual report to the other
corporations within 180 days of the close of the company’s fiscal year.112
Moreover, subsection 3(d) requires the Section 7(i) annual report to
provide an “itemization of the Corporation’s Section 7(i) Costs by
category of allowable costs as maintained by the Corporation in its books
and records.”113 The Sealaska arbitration panel noted: “[W]e believe that
105. Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 17–18.
106. Id. at 19.
107. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 65.
108. See ANCSA § 7(i).
109. Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, at 14 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported mem. op.)
(on file with authors).
110. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 65.
111. SEALASKA CORP., 2001 Annual Report to Shareholders, 19 (on file with
authors).
112. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 65.
113. Id. at 69.
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the drafters of the agreement intended to make substantial compliance
with the record-keeping requirements a condition precedent to the
allowance of a deduction for costs which are to be described in the
records.”114
Furthermore, section 8 provides that any regional corporation may
“commence an audit or other examination” of the financial and
contractual records of a reporting corporation within twelve months of
the transmittal of a Section 7(i) annual report.115 In the event that a
corporation institutes an audit, it must give a sixty-day notice to every
other corporation, including the corporation to be audited.116 Each
regional corporation has the right to join the audit and to expand the list
of audited items.117 Thereafter, to prevent the disruption of business and
duplication of efforts, no other corporation is permitted to audit or
examine the same report.118 If the results of the audit show that the
reporting regional corporation understated Net Section 7(i) Revenues by
5% or more, but not less than $100,000, then the audited regional
corporation must pay the costs of the audit.119 Otherwise, the audit costs
are the responsibility of the regional corporation or corporations that
requested the audit.120
Section 9 addresses the consequences of a corporation’s failure to
transmit its Section 7(i) annual report. In such circumstances, any other
corporation may give sixty days written notice and then commence an
“audit or other examination of the pertinent financial and contractual
records of the non-reporting Corporation.”121 In essence, a regional
corporation can perform the financial reporting and issue a Section 7(i)
annual report for a non-reporting region, and this audit becomes binding
on the non-reporting region unless challenged in arbitration within 120
days of issuance of the report.122 While this provision has never been
exercised, it highlights the importance of the Section 7(i) annual report to
the other regional corporations as stakeholders in Section 7(i) Resources
outside their own regions.
Additionally, section 10 provides that a regional corporation may
escrow revenues if it is “uncertain how to treat revenues received or
expenses incurred . . . and avoid the interest and penalty provisions of

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 47, at 37.
Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73–74.
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Section 2” of Article V while it initiates an arbitration to seek resolution
of the issues.123 This provision may provide an option for corporations as
they wrestle with matters unforeseen at the time of the Settlement
Agreement like carbon credits, conservation easements, and other matters
not clearly addressed by the Agreement.124
Article VI – Arbitration
Article VI makes arbitration the exclusive method for Settlement
Agreement dispute resolution, with exceptions for disputes involving
“Federal or State income tax consequences of revenues, deductions,
distributions, or any other income tax issues.”125 The Special Master
explained: “The Agreement does not purport to resolve the Federal or
state income tax consequences of [Section 7(i)] revenues, deductions,
distributions or other issues. Indeed, the Agreement . . . expressly
excludes such issues from arbitration.”126
The topic of depletion was a significant hang-up among the regional
corporations when negotiating the Settlement Agreement. In a letter to
the Special Master, ten regional corporations recounted: “[A] clear
majority of the corporations were in agreement that the Section 7(i)
Agreement was not intended to resolve the issues of depletion. It was
recognized that it was impossible to get agreement on this issue and some
corporations expressed the view that it was a tax matter and not a matter
for [the Agreement].”127
In reviewing the final draft of the Settlement Agreement, Doyon’s
outside counsel noted the purpose of the arbitration provisions:
The object of the Agreement is to avoid further litigation over
Section 7(i) issues, and all of Article V is devoted to procedures
for implementing the settlement . . . . Article VI of the Agreement
further provides that . . . all issues arising under Section 7(i) or
the Agreement shall be subject exclusively to arbitration.128
An earlier draft of the Settlement Agreement did not include binding
arbitration provisions and required three corporations to join the request
for arbitration, which caused Doyon’s legal counsel to remark:

123. Id. at 74.
124. See Schutt, supra note 5, at 268–70.
125. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 77–83.
126. Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 26.
127. Letter from Chugach Natives, Inc. and Bristol Bay Native Corp. to Ralph
Wienshienk, Special Master (Nov. 12, 1982) (on file with authors).
128. Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 5.
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Doyon may as well get an outside law firm and put it
permanently on retainer to do nothing but handle appeals from
Section 7(i) arbitrations, because it is virtually guaranteed that
we will have an even higher level of litigation, and more
attorneys’ fees, than we have at the present time.129
In the 1980s, several regions filed arbitration cases that resulted in
final decisions regarding the applicability of Section 7(i) to land
exchanged between ASRC and the federal government and to Sealaska
timber.130 Following the arbitration, Sealaska filed suit in federal district
court attempting to overturn the arbitrators’ decision.131 In rejecting
Sealaska’s challenge, the court noted: “The corporations intended the
Agreement to be a definitive declaration of their revenue sharing
obligations under section 7(i), and to provide an alternative mechanism
for resolving any controversies that might arise in the future regarding
those obligations.”132 The court rejected Sealaska’s arguments for
escaping the binding nature of the arbitration clause in the Agreement,
stating: “When parties agree to commit a particular question to binding
arbitration before a specialized tribunal, a federal district court may not
disturb their decision, absent special circumstances . . . .”133
In the ASRC arbitration proceeding regarding the Kaktovik Land
Exchange, ASRC made a legal argument that “the Claimants have waived
their rights to arbitrate the issues raised in these proceedings by reason of
the fact that they have participated in the formulation of pending
legislation before the Congress of the United States.”134 The arbitrators
ruled against ASRC on this point.135
The Settlement Agreement adopts the ‘loser-pays’ rule otherwise
applicable in civil litigation in Alaska’s state courts under Rule 82 of
Alaska’s Rules of Civil Procedure.136 The Agreement defines the
“prevailing party” as the defendant regional corporation “if the outcome

129. Memorandum from Elizabeth Ingraham, supra note 17.
130. See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., AAA No. 75113030986
(Aug. 14, 1989) [hereinafter ASRC Arbitration Decision] (Morris, Arb.) (on file
with authors); Sealaska Arbitration Decision, supra note 29; see also Schutt, supra
note 5, at 242–46 (discussing arbitration cases).
131. See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut VI), Civ. No. A88-515
(Jan. 24, 1989) (on file with authors). The court merged the case with the original
Aleut v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. case, Civ. No. A75-053.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 9–10; see also id. at 17 (“Sealaska’s decision to sign the Agreement
and save itself the costs of perpetual litigation was an informed and intelligent
waiver of its right to argue in this forum . . . .”).
134. ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 79, at 19.
135. See id.
136. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 82.
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of the arbitration and any appeal does not increase its Net Section 7(i)
Revenues before any carry-forward of deductions by five percent (5%) or
more, but not less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).”137
In the Sealaska arbitration, the arbitrators awarded the claimant
regional corporations $1.0 million in attorneys’ fees.138 In the ASRC
arbitration, the arbitrators found ASRC to be the prevailing party and
awarded it 75% of its actual fees, or $1.2 million, as a “reasonable and
appropriate sum . . . in a very complex case.”139
Per section 15, post-arbitration proceedings are governed by chapter
09.43 of the Alaska Statutes.140 However, the Superior Court for the Third
Judicial District in Anchorage is the exclusive venue for such
proceedings.141 Sealaska challenged the applicability of this section as a
part of the Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. (Aleut VI)142 case,
arguing that did not prevent it from removing the post-arbitration
proceeding from state court to federal court.143 The federal district court
held that the “forum selection clause at issue is exclusive and
mandatory,” before remanding the arbitration enforcement action to state
court.144
Article VII – Settlement Provisions Relating to Past Transactions
Although lacking relevance to current Section 7(i) controversies,
Article VII was critically important at the time of negotiations due to the
long time period covered by the Settlement Agreement (1972 to 1982), the
multiple court cases involved, and the interaction with prior settlement
agreements among less than the full twelve regions.145 Article VII begins
by setting March 31, 1982, as the cut-off date. That is, the Settlement
Agreement governs all determinations of revenues and costs on and after
April 1, 1982.146
Sections 2 and 3 set out the agreed upon past Section 7(i) revenues
earned and costs expensed by each regional corporation, with the
exception of ASRC. In Doyon’s case, the negotiated amounts were
significant:

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 90.
Sealaska Arbitration Decision, supra note 29, at 10.
ASRC Arbitration Decision, supra note 130, at 6.
See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 83.
Id.
Aleut VI, Civ. No. A88-515 (on file with authors).
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19, 21.
See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 91–100.
See id. at 91.
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Doyon was able to increase the amount of its claimed past
deductions from about $2.5 million to $5,922,911—primarily by
applying to direct Section 7(i) expenses an allocation of G&A
costs which had not been used before. More importantly, the
Doyon representatives were able to convince a majority of the
other Regional Corporations that, because of its substantial
earlier investments, Doyon’s active development revenues
(through its subsidiary, Tanana Asbestos Corp.) from the Doyon
asbestos project should be excluded from shareable Section 7(i)
revenues and that only Doyon’s income under the primary lease
(passive development) need be shared under ANCSA.147
Section 4 summarizes what each regional corporation owed based
upon the difference between the amounts in sections 2 and 3, less prior
distributions made. Sections 5 and 6 set out the deduction carry-forwards
and prior excess distributions for each regional corporation.
Section 7 structures the payment of Section 7(i) revenues from the
settlement period (1972 to 1981) for ASRC in recognition of the magnitude
of certain revenues in question at the time of settlement.148 ASRC agreed
to pay $7,250,000 in installments, with $1,500,000 payable within thirty
days of the dismissal of the Aleut case, and the balance in not more than
ten annual payments.149
Section 11 requires each party to dismiss all claims from Aleut with
prejudice, and blocks the Settlement Agreement from going into effect
until they had done so.150 The district court issued an order dismissing the
case with prejudice on June 3, 1983.151
Article VIII – Miscellaneous
Article VIII includes miscellaneous provisions. 152 Section 1
recognizes that the Agreement was a compromise of “current disputes
and disagreements over the interpretation and application of Section 7(i)
of ANCSA” and specifically the Aleut case.153 Just as importantly, the
provision recognizes that the Agreement governs the “future relationship
of the parties towards one another in complying with Section 7(i)” and
acknowledged that the parties had “foregone legitimate [legal] positions”
147. Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 6–7.
148. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 87–90.
149. See id. at 87–88.
150. Id. at 91.
151. See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 6 (D.
Alaska June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with
authors).
152. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 93–100.
153. Id. at 100.
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in order to reach agreement.154 In his report to the Aleut court, the Special
Master summarized the history and importance of the provision: “As
with any achievable compromise, few of the Agreement’s provisions
satisfied all parties. However, the consensual nature of a unanimous
Agreement reached after extensive arm’s length bargaining demonstrates
the fairness and feasibility of the whole.”155 The arbitrators in the ASRC
case noted one example:
ASRC initially deducted the cost of lobbying for passage of
ANILCA against Section 7(i) revenues. These deductions were
challenged in the Section 7(i) federal court litigation and were
ultimately compromised in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Settlement Agreement.156
Section 2 provides that the Agreement was an integrated agreement
that “express[es] the entire agreement and understanding of the
parties.”157 In this case, the clause was particularly important, as ASRC
had finalized several settlement agreements with other individual
regional corporations that were superseded by the Agreement.158
Section 3 is a severability provision. It provides that Articles II, III
and IV “are the essence of th[e] Agreement,” excepting sections 7 (sand
and gravel) and 8 (mergers of corporations) of Article II.159 It further
recognizes the grand compromises inherent in the settlement agreement
and the fact that many of the provisions are interdependent.160 Section 3
provides that if a court materially changes the financial aspects of the
Agreement by determining that any of the referenced provisions are
“incompatible with ANCSA,” then “the entire Agreement shall be
rendered prospectively void and unenforceable and that they will
promptly attempt in good faith to negotiate a new Agreement.”161
Section 7 is an extensive provision regarding indemnification.162 This
section creates indemnity between regional corporations in the event of a
successful suit brought by a village corporation, or at-large shareholder,

154. Id.
155. Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 13.
156. ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 79, at 9.
157. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 93.
158. See id. at 98 (“Arctic Slope has previously entered into settlement
agreements with Ahtna, Inc., Bering Straits Native Corporation, Calista
Corporation, NANA Regional Corporation, Inc., Chugach Natives, Inc., and
Bristol Bay Native Corporation.”); see also Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., supra
note 9.
159. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 94.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 101–02.
162. See id. at 103–07.
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against either a recipient corporation or a distributing corporation.163 This
provision reflects the regional corporations’ understanding of the risk
attending to the village corporations’ non-party status and the then
legally untested interactions between Sections 7(i), 7(j), and the Settlement
Agreement.164
Subsection (g) concludes by providing that the Settlement
Agreement does not create a cause of action for village corporations or
regional corporation shareholders.165 Several lawsuits by village
corporations and at-large shareholders in the 1990s challenged this legal
conclusion, but the regional corporations ultimately prevailed in the
litigation.166
Article IX – Ratification of Agreement
Article IX requires that at least ten of the twelve regional
corporations ratify the Agreement for it to become effective and binding
on all corporations that had ratified it.167 It also provides for the method
of ratification, the effective date, and the deadline for ratification of
October 1, 1982.168 An arbitration panel “interpret[ed] the effective date .
. . as the date on which a resolution of notification of the tenth corporation
was served, or 1982, even though court approval was not given until June
of 1983.”169 Each of the twelve regional corporations ratified the
Agreement by the October 1, 1982 deadline.170
Section 1 requires that each corporation cooperate in the defense of
the Agreement in “any legal action by anyone not a party to this
Agreement.”171 The parties included this provision because village
corporations were not parties to the Settlement Agreement and the
regional corporations knew there was some risk of a Section 7(j)
163. Id. at 103–06.
164. See Schutt, supra note 5, at 258–59 (describing legal challenges to the
Settlement Agreement brought by village corporations); Lazarus Memo, supra
note 43, at 8–9 (anticipating risk of village corporations “challenging the
Agreement or any distributions made pursuant thereto”).
165. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 107.
166. See Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1999); Bay View, Inc.
ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997); Dagg
v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A94-044, slip op. at 1–2 (D. Alaska May 2,
1994) (on file with authors). This article discusses each of these cases in more
detail, see infra Part III.
167. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 98.
168. See id. at 101.
169. Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 47, at 38.
170. See Resolution of Doyon Bd., No. 82-53 (Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with
authors); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 5 (D. Alaska
June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with authors).
171. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 100.
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“attack”on the Agreement, challenging whether they should have been
parties and signatories because of their inherent economic interest in 7(i)
sharing among the regional corporations.172
Article X – Amendments
The regional corporations intentionally made the amendment
process for the Settlement Agreement very difficult. Article X requires
consensus among all twelve regional corporations for the enactment of an
amendment.173 Despite the difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreement
among the regional corporations, there have been two amendments: (1) a
major revision in 1990 changing the methodology for calculating revenue
under Section 7(i) for timber resources,174 and (2) an amendment
addressing scholarships for shareholders from resource revenue.175
Article XI – Review
Article XI provides that the corporations shall meet approximately
every two years “for the purpose of reviewing how the Agreement is
operating and whether any modifications seem desirable.”176 Despite the
presence of this Article, the regional corporations have not met in many
years to discuss the Agreement or modification of it.
Appendix A
Appendix A provides accounting procedures for operating
equipment and facilities.177 It “provides guidance for compliance with the
cost allocation provisions of Article III Section 5.”178 The appendix has
four parts: Scope and Applicability, Definitions and General Principles,
Basic Considerations, and Special Considerations.179

172. See Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 9 (explaining the legal cooperation
provision to Doyon Board of Directors).
173. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 102.
174. See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
176. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 103–04.
177. Id. at 104.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 104–11.
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Appendix B
Appendix B addresses two region-specific issues.180 First, it
addresses a resource-specific issue in the Doyon region involving an
asbestos deposit.181 The appendix provided that Doyon:
Shall be deemed to receive Gross Passive Section 7(i) Revenues
and incur Passive Section 7(i) Costs as Lessor under its lease for
asbestos development in the area of Eagle, Alaska, with GCO
Minerals Co., Tanana Asbestos Corp., and Boreal Exploration
Co., Lessees, and shall not be deemed to receive Gross Active
Section 7(i) Revenues or incur Active Section 7(i) Costs through
the operations of Tanana Asbestos Corp., its wholly-owned
subsidiary, as Lessee under such lease.182
The agreement to treat revenues and expenses as passive, in this
particular case, is the opposite of the treatment that those revenues and
expenses would otherwise receive under the Agreement given Doyon’s
100% ownership of Tanana Asbestos Corp.183
Second, the Agreement addresses a settlement payment between
Chugach Natives, Inc. and the United States that concluded in summer
1982.184 According to the settlement, Chugach had the “choice of
accepting $12 million or exercising certain timber cutting rights within a
National Forest.”185 Chugach chose the $12 million, but that raised the
question of whether part, or all, of the $12 million was shareable.186 Under
the Agreement, a compromise was reached providing that the first
$2,460,014 “was used to eliminate Chugach’s carry-forward of past
deductions [under Article VII, section 5],” but the remaining $9,539,986
was non-shareable.187

180. Id. at 112.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 5–6 (explaining the rationale behind
Appendix B of Agreement to Doyon Board of Directors).
186. Id.
187. See id. at 6 (further explaining details of Appendix B); Settlement
Agreement, supra note 2, at 86, 112.
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Since the finalization of the Settlement Agreement in the early 1980s,
all three relevant constituencies—village corporations, individual at-large
shareholders, and regional corporations—have challenged the
Agreement in court.
Concurrent with the finalization and court-approval of the
Settlement Agreement in 1982 to 1983, several village corporations sought
to intervene in the litigation to protect their interests in the Aleut case.188
This happened in May 1982, just one month prior to the culmination of
the multi-year effort to finalize the Settlement Agreement.189 In February
1983, the district court denied the motion, ruling that it was untimely.190
In affirming the district court decision, the Ninth Circuit stated:
We reach this conclusion on the assumption that the regions did
not represent the villages in the section 7(i) litigation. . . . Our
assumption that the villages were not represented by the regions
would, were it to be determined to be correct, enable the villages
to challenge the applicability of Chugach to dually owned land
as well as the settlement agreement to the extent it affected their
interests.191
In 1989, following several years of arbitration interpreting the
provisions of the Settlement Agreement regarding timber harvest,
Sealaska filed suit in federal district court.192 Sealaska asked the court to
issue a preliminary injunction while simultaneously asking the court to
reopen the earlier Aleut cases and set aside the arbitration decisions.193
Meanwhile, the prevailing regional corporations filed a case in Alaska
state court to enforce the arbitration award.194 Sealaska removed the state
court case to federal district court and all of the issues were decided
together.195 The federal district court upheld the binding nature of the
arbitration provisions of the Settlement Agreement and rejected
Sealaska’s other arguments, which attempted to re-litigate issues
addressed in the arbitration.196 The court noted that the “corporations
188. Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek Native Corp., 725 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1984).
189. Id. at 528–29.
190. Id. at 529.
191. Id. at 530 (referencing Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723
(9th Cir. 1979)). It should be noted that the court made no holding with respect to
whether the villages were represented by the regions. Id.
192. Aleut VI, Civ. No. A88-515, at 7–8 (Jan. 24, 1989) (on file with authors); see
also Schutt, supra note 5, at 261–62 (summarizing timber harvest litigation).
193. See Aleut VI, Civ. No. A88-515, at 7–8.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 8–9.
196. Id. at 9–20.
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intended the Agreement to be a definitive declaration of their revenue
sharing obligations under Section 7(i)” and that “signators included . . . a
binding arbitration clause which provides only for limited judicial
review.”197 The court concluded that Sealaska’s decision “was an
informed and intelligent waiver of its right to argue in this forum that a
particular method for determining fair market value violates ANCSA.”198
Furthermore, in 1994, in Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps.
v. Ahtna, Inc. (Bay View I), a village corporation in the Bristol Bay region
and Lewis Olsen, an individual at-large shareholder of Bristol Bay Native
Corporation, brought suit claiming that ANCSA Sections 7(i) and 7(j)
required ten regional corporations to share proceeds from the sale of net
operating losses (NOLs)—a tax benefit largely derived from the unique
structure of a regional corporation’s options for setting the tax basis for
its resource properties.199 The NOL tie to 7(i) resources was the genesis of
the Bay View I challenge as well as other similar litigation. An Anchorage
Times story in 1989 explained NOLs and their history with Alaska Native
corporations:
In 1984, Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, persuaded Congress to help
the native corporations by inserting a special tax break into that
year’s tax reform act. . . . [T]he break has allowed the
corporations to earn more than $500 million by selling past
operating and paper losses to high-profit Lower 48 corporations
looking for ways to reduce their tax bills.
Those corporations were allowed to apply the losses against
their profits; they then passed up to 80 percent of the resultant
tax savings on to their native corporate partners.200
NOL sales were a major boost to the profits of a number of regional
corporations in the late 1980s—a time when many were struggling
financially.201

197. Id. at 5–6.
198. Id. at 17.
199. Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc. (Bay View I),
Civ. No. A94-0551, at 4 (D. Alaska July 6, 1995) (unreported mem. op.) (on file
with authors).
200. Bob Ortega, Calista Wants Cut of Tax Sales, ANCHORAGE TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989,
at A-1, A-10.
201. See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Profits Soar for Native Corporations, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 1989, at C-1, C-2 (on file with authors).
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Both plaintiffs in the Bay View I case sought to represent classes, the
village corporations and the at-large shareholders, respectively.202 The
plaintiffs claimed that the NOLs that the ten regional corporations sold
derived from losses attributable to natural resources and were therefore
subject to Section 7(i).203
The issue of NOLs and the applicability of Section 7(i) had been
brewing for several years during the pendency of the NOL transactions
of the late 1980s.204 In late 1990, CIRI’s President, Roy Huhndorf, wrote a
letter to each of the other regional corporations’ CEOs urging that they
reach a consensus position on the NOL issue.205 Mr. Huhndorf noted “[i]f
you did an NOL deal and didn’t share the proceeds under 7(i) (which is
true of everyone but NANA), you have already made the decision that
NOL’s are not shareable.”206
In the Bay View I litigation, the regional corporation defendants
challenged the standing of the plaintiffs, specifically raising the question
of whether either plaintiff could bring a direct private right of action
against regional corporations outside the Bristol Bay region.207
The court noted that Section 7(i) is “qualified by subsections 7(ℓ) and
7(m). These subsections allow a regional corporation to use some or all of
its subsection 7(j) funds for joint ventures between the village
corporations in that region and the regional corporation, or for use by the
regional corporation for projects that will benefit the region generally.”208
“Inasmuch as subsection 7(i) entitles all 12 regional corporations to
a share in resource revenues, and since regional corporations are entitled
to retain a significant percentage of those revenues . . . it follows that each
regional corporation has a very significant, direct financial interest in
assuring the receipt of what is due it under subsection 7(i).”209
The court found that with respect to at-large shareholder plaintiff
Olsen, there was no direct cause of action.210 The court found that the
“most obvious indication of this conclusion is the language of ANCSA
itself,” which provides for no such right, despite expressly providing for

202. See Bay View I, Civ. No. A94-0551, at 7.
203. See id. at 4–5.
204. See Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps., 105 F.3d at 1283–84
(describing NOL background and history); Schutt, supra note 5, at 259–60
(describing history of NOL litigation).
205. Letter from Roy M. Huhndorf, President, CIRI, to Reg’l Corp. CEOs (Oct.
24, 1990) (on file with authors).
206. Id. at 2.
207. See Bay View I, Civ. No. A94-0551, at 7.
208. Id. at 8 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i), (ℓ), (m)).
209. Id. at 13.
210. See id. at 11–12.

34.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

11/26/2017 6:21 PM

SECTION 7(I) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

231

other litigation rights within the Act.211 Instead, the court noted that “it is
the Bristol Bay Native Corporation which is entitled to receive subsection
7(i) proceeds and that corporate entity is answerable to Mr. Olsen for his
rights as an at large shareholder.”212
Similarly, the court found that Congress did not create a direct cause
of action for a village corporation against regional corporations outside of
its region.213 In reaching its conclusion, the court repeatedly noted
Congress’s directive that ANCSA “be effected ‘without litigation.’”214
While it ultimately dismissed the action, the court did “assume[] without
deciding that there is at least the possibility of a state law cause of action
by villages against their regional corporation for failure to enforce rights
under ANCSA as to which the villages have a direct, beneficial
interest.”215
On appeal, the litigation focus changed dramatically as Congress
had amended ANCSA Section 7(i) to clarify that NOL sales were not
subject to Section 7(i) sharing.216
A few years later in Oliver v. Sealaska Corp.,217 an at-large shareholder
of Sealaska and CIRI sued each of the regional corporations.218 The
plaintiff “challenge[d] the legality of Article IV and Article II, Subsection
6(g) of the Settlement Agreement.”219 He sought a court ruling that “it was
an ultra vires action of the corporations to agree to these terms because
the terms wrongly limit the village corporations’ and at-large
shareholders’ rights to shareable revenues under ANCSA subsection
7(i).”220 In short, Oliver attempted a direct attack on the Settlement

211. Id. at 11.
212. Id. at 12.
213. Id. at 11.
214. Id. at 11–13.
215. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
216. Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d
1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting “Congress made the 1995 Amendment fully
retroactive” and the court therefore “need not decide whether village
corporations or at-large shareholders have an implied right of action to enforce
section 7(i) in federal court.”); see also Bay View, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl.
494, 497 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2000) (“The court concludes, on the basis of section 1606(i)’s
plain language, that NOL revenues were not shareable revenues under section
1606(i) as enacted. . . . Accordingly, . . . Congress took nothing when it enacted the
1995 amendment clarifying that NOL revenues were not shareable revenues.”).
217. Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., Civ. No. A96-0343, slip op. (D. Alaska Sept. 24,
1997) (on file with authors).
218. Id. at 1–2 (on file with authors).
219. Id. at 11. Article IV is titled “Calculation of Distributable Revenues.”
Article II, subsection 6(g) is the language addressing land exchanges of surface
estate for surface estate, subsurface estate, or both, and excluding it from revenue
sharing.
220. Id. at 11–12.
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Agreement and the legality of the regional corporations entering into the
Agreement without direct representation of village corporations and atlarge shareholders in the negotiations.
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding “that plaintiff
may not bring a direct cause of action under [Alaska Statute] 10.06.015.”221
The court went on to explain “a second reason” for the dismissal that:
[R]elates to the very fact that there has been over twenty years
of litigation on the reach of ANCSA subsection 7(i). . . .
Subsection 7(i) is, very simply put, a problem; it is a problem that
affects regional corporations, village corporations, and at-large
shareholders in a variety of ways. It is inappropriate for a
problem that affects everybody to be brought in a private, direct
action by a single shareholder with no claim against anyone but
his own two regional corporations.222
The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendant
regional corporations under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.223 The
court concluded that an award of fees under Alaska law was appropriate
despite the fact that “the case [wa]s before th[e] court on removal because
of federal question jurisdiction.”224 The court noted that “Oliver’s
complaint was founded upon the doctrine of ultra vires corporate conduct
and was brought on the basis of [Alaska Statute] 10.06.015,” and held that
where Alaska substantive law was the basis of the dispute, the availability
of attorneys’ fees under Alaska substantive law was appropriate.225 This
was an important ruling for regional corporations because Alaska Rule 82
helps prevent unfounded or repetitive litigation by assessing a portion of
the winning party’s attorneys’ fees to the loser.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision holding that
“nothing in the text of the revenue-sharing provision creates an express
private right of action to enforce the section’s mandates” and finding that
the factors test regarding whether a private right of action may be implied
by the statutory text did not in fact support any such right of action.226
Similarly, in Dagg v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.,227 an at-large
shareholder of Cook Inlet Region, Inc. sought to institute a class action
“against ASRC to recover funds which he contend[ed] were not shared
with the other regional corporations as required by [Section 7(i)]” and to
221. Id. at 14.
222. Id. at 17.
223. Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., Civ. No. A96-0343, slip op. at 20–21 (D. Alaska
Feb. 9, 1998) (on file with authors).
224. Id. at 6.
225. Id.
226. Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220, 1223–25 (9th Cir. 1999).
227. Civ. No. A94-044 (May 2, 1994) (on file with authors).
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set aside the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement.228 The court dismissed the
action holding “[t]his is not a derivative suit and Congress did not give
individual shareholders a private right of action to enforce corporate
opportunities.”229

IV. TIME FOR AMENDMENT?
The parties to the Settlement Agreement have only amended the
complex document twice in thirty-five years.230 In the intervening time,
statutory amendments enacted by Congress to Section 7(i), as well as
court decisions, as discussed herein, have changed the landscape upon
which the Settlement Agreement was concluded. This section, therefore,
proposes several potential subjects that might be worthy of review and
amendment.
A main reason to amend the Agreement is to modernize it. For
example, the current notice provision of the Agreement requires: “All
notices . . . shall be in writing and shall be communicated to the
Corporations by certified mail, return receipt requested.”231 The
Settlement Agreement does not include a provision allowing for
electronic communication of required notice.
Another area ripe for modernization is the constant dollar provision
of section 5 in Article VIII. That provision provides for inflationary
adjustment of dollar figures in various provisions of the Agreement like
the standard deduction of $300,000 per year for general and
administrative costs in Article III, section 1(c).232 While, the five-year
inflationary adjustment has provided for increasing the dollar amounts,
the corporations themselves have also grown significantly in the more
than three decades since the Settlement Agreement was executed. As
such, merely adjusting for inflation from time-to-time has not matched
the economic realities of the regional corporations’ growth, which has far
outpaced inflation. That growth, and changing conditions generally, may
warrant adjustments of some of the provisions providing specific dollar
amounts.
Another obvious choice for modernization of the Agreement would
be incorporating amendments to ANCSA that affect Section 7(i) into the
Agreement itself. For example, despite an amendment to ANCSA Section

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text.
Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 95–96.
Id. at 38.
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7(i) in 1995 specifically addressing tax benefits,233 and a Ninth Circuit case
involving the issue,234 the regional corporations have not amended the
Agreement to address tax benefits arising from natural resource
development, including net operating losses, depletion allowances, and
various forms of tax credits.235
Similarly, although a congressional amendment to ANCSA has
rendered sand, gravel, and rock non-shareable, the Agreement still
includes a provision addressing the sharing of revenue from sand, gravel
and rock.236 The Agreement’s provision even anticipated the 1998
congressional amendment to ANCSA that made sand, gravel, and rock
non-shareable.237
There have also been new developments that apply to ANCSA land,
which the parties to the Agreement could not have possibly contemplated
in 1982. One example is the expansion of various types of legal entities
recognized by state and federal laws in the time since 1982. The
Agreement recognizes corporations, partnerships, and trusts, but it did
not anticipate limited liability companies, limited partnerships, or other
corporate forms legally recognized more recently than 1982.238 As a
related matter, the complexity of ordinary business transactions
regarding capital-intensive developments has blossomed in recent years.
The relatively simplistic approach of the Agreement may not be adequate
should a dispute arise regarding the treatment of previously uncommon
(or non-existent) uses of financial mechanisms, such as preferred equity

233. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, sec. 109, § 7(i), 109 Stat. 353, 357
(1995) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ does not include any
benefit received or realized for the use of losses incurred or credits earned by a
Regional Corporation.”).
234. See Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d
1281 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court dismissal of suit challenging 1995
amendment as unconstitutional taking).
235. Doyon and other regions identified the benefit of the resource-owning
region keeping full depletion allowances under the Internal Revenue Code within
a few years of ANCSA. In a 1976 memorandum to the Doyon Board, John Sackett
stated Doyon’s position on the issue: “[O]ther regions do not have a sufficient
economic interest in the resources in place to warrant the depletion pass through.”
Memorandum from John Sackett, President, Doyon, Ltd., to Doyon Bd. of Dirs.,
at 2 (May 16, 1976) (on file with authors).
236. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 35.
237. See id. (anticipating congressional action); see also ANCSA Land Bank
Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-333, § 8, 112 Stat. 3129, 3134 (codifed at
ANCSA § 7(i), 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)). The Agreement references sand, gravel, and
rock one other time in Article III, § 3(c)(i)(C). Settlement Agreement, supra note 2,
at 44, Article III, § 3(c)(i)(C).
238. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 8.
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or back leverage, in determining whether a regional corporation’s
participation should be treated under the Agreement’s active or passive
rules.
The Agreement also did not anticipate the sale of conservation
easements.239 Conservation easements are transactions where a
landowner will retain ownership of a parcel of land but permanently
restrict development of that land.240 Often, though not always, the
landowner will receive a tax benefit in exchange for the conservation
easement.241 Conservation easements have not been tested in the context
of Section 7(i), although there have been several recent transactions
involving ANCSA lands.242 Because of the 1995 amendments to ANCSA,
specifically amending Section 7(i) to address tax benefits, it is clear that
Section 7(i) does not require sharing in a conservation easement
transaction where the only benefit received by the regional corporation
landowner is a tax benefit.243 Regional corporations should consider
amending the Agreement to reflect this result. In addition, the Agreement
could address the situation where a regional corporation receives cash or
some other benefit in exchange for part or all of a conservation easement.
Finally, the regional corporations should address carbon credit
transactions in any amendment. “A forest carbon offset, is a metric ton of
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)—the emission of which is avoided or
newly stored—that is purchased by greenhouse gas emitters to
compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere.”244 In 2015, the California
Air Resources Board extended the geographic area of forested lands
239. See Schutt, supra note 5, at 269 (explaining that “conservation easements
have not been tested in the context of Section 7(i)”).
240. See Internal Revenue Service, Conservation Easement Audit Techniques
Guide (revised Jan. 3, 2012) (defining “conservation easement”) (on file with
authors).
241. See id.
242. See Pedro Bay Corporation Conservation Easement Project Description, PEDRO
BAY CORP., http://www.pedrobaycorp.com/index.php/latest-news/310-pedrobay-corporation-conservation-easement-project-description (last visited Sept. 14,
2017) (describing Pedro Bay Corporation’s efforts to establish conservation
easements on parts of its land); Agulowak Conservation Easement, BRISTOL BAY
HERITAGE LAND TRUST,
http://www.bristolbaylandtrust.org/agulowakconservation-easement (last visited June 17, 2017) (describing a conservation
easement established on Native land by Aleknagik Native LTD).
243. ANCSA § 7(i)(2) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’
does not include any benefit received or realized for the use of losses incurred or
credits earned by a Regional Corporation.”); see also Bay View, Inc. v. U.S., 278
F.3d 1259, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
244. Christine Yankel, FAQ Forest Carbon Projects, THE CLIMATE TRUST (Aug. 1,
2014),
http://www.climatetrust.org/forest-carbon-projects-faq/
(internal
quotations omitted); see also Schutt supra note 5, at 268–69 (describing forest
carbon offsets and their potential treatment under ANCSA’s revenue sharing
provision).
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eligible to participate in its program to include the southeast and southern
coastal areas in Alaska that are not in National Forests.245 Several regional
corporations are pursuing transactions involving the forest carbon
projects on ANCSA lands.246 While this issue is likely to be contentious, a
negotiated set of rules would make future transactions much more
predictable and less risky to regions considering those or similar
transactions.

CONCLUSION
The ANCSA Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement has withstood the
test of time. Thirty-five years after it ended a persistent cycle of litigation,
and twenty-five years after several arbitration cases tested its provisions,
the ANCSA regional corporation parties to the Agreement have benefited
from a long period of certainty around resource development on ANCSA
lands.
The parties clearly anticipated that the Settlement Agreement would
be a living document that could be amended to address unanticipated
issues as they arose. Yet, in the thirty-five years since the effective date of
the Agreement, the regional corporations have only agreed to amend the
Agreement twice. Given the many changes in the intervening decades, it
is time that the regional corporations closely study amending the
Agreement to reflect modern transactions and changes. That effort could
provide another long period of certainty under the grand compromise
which was the Settlement Agreement.

245. Cal. Air. Res. Bd., Compliance Offset Protocol U.S. Forest Offset Projects (last
updated Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/
usforest/usforestprojects_2015.htm.
246. See Ahtna Kanas, AHTNA, INC., at 5 (Winter 2016), http://ahtnainc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/AHA020-4th-Quarter-2016_web.pdf
(describing Ahtna’s ongoing efforts to sell carbon stocks).

